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 In his article, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, Professor 
Nance has certainly made a valuable contribution to the literature by 
cautioning us against using the term “reliability” in an imprecise 
manner suggesting that reliability is a binary, dichotomous concept.1  
In the haste to make a point about another aspect of Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 and its progeny, we can succumb to the 
temptation to oversimplify the treatment of reliability and 
inadvertently imply that the reliability is a categorical,3 all-or-nothing4 
proposition.  I would be the first to admit that I have sometimes 
written sentences carrying that implication.  Professor Nance, 
however, constructs a persuasive case that there is no invariant 
reliability threshold5 or uniform, minimum reliability level6 that 
proffered expert testimony must satisfy in order to be admissible. 
The question is not whether the concept of reliability is a relative 
one.  Rather, the issue is in which respects the concept is relative.  
There are at least three respects in which the concept is certainly 
relative: (1) the specificity of the theory or technique the expert 
asserts; (2) the use to which the expert’s proponent wants to put the 
claim; and (3) the definiteness with which the expert proposes 
couching his or her ultimate opinion.  Part I of this Article discusses 
the first respect.  Essentially concurring with Professor Risinger’s 
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recent article,7 Part I contends that the foundational showing of 
reliability should vary with the precise theory or technique the expert 
invokes.  The focus should be a narrow one, squarely on that theory 
or technique.  Part II turns to the second respect, the use to which 
the expert’s proponent wants to put the theory or technique.  This 
Part asks whether the proponent is content to prove simply that the 
theory exists and is current in the expert’s field, or whether the 
proponent wants to draw a further  inference from the application of 
the theory.  The reliability foundations for these two uses of the 
theory differ fundamentally.8  Part III addresses the third respect, 
adding that the reliability concept is also variable in regard to the 
definiteness of the expert’s proposed opinion.  The more definite the 
opinion the expert offers, the more extensive the reliability 
foundation must be.  In each of these respects, I agree with Professor 
Nance’s thesis that reliability should be conceived in relative terms.  
Indeed, as this Article concludes, the identification of those respects 
may help courts develop a workable approach to determining 
whether proffered expert testimony possesses the requisite degree of 
reliability. 
Near the end of his article, however, Professor Nance urges that 
reliability be treated as relative in still another respect: in comparison 
to other expert testimony available to the expert’s proponent.9  In an 
earlier exchange with Professors Faigman, Kaye, Saks, and Sanders, I 
voiced my opposition to incorporating a better or best evidence 
principle into the analysis of foundations for Rule 702 opinions.10  
During that exchange, I took the position that it would be unsound 
to adopt such a principle either as a matter of statutory construction 
or as one of evidentiary policy.  I still adhere to that position.  
However, while Professor Faigman and his co-authors appeared to 
favor a rather general better evidence principle, Professor Nance’s 
proposal is much more complex.  His proposal turns on such 
considerations as whether the proponent of the evidence is a repeat 
player in the litigation system11 and whether better evidence is 
 
 7 D. Michael Risinger, Defining the ‘Task at Hand’: Non-Science Forensic Science After 
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 9 Nance, supra note 1, at Part II. 
 10 Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Final Comment—The Importance of the Procedural 
Framework, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 669 (1999) [hereinafter A Final Comment]; Edward 
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the Best, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19 (1999) [hereinafter Enough is Enough]. 
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reasonably available to the opponent who objects to the admission of 
the proponent’s expert testimony.12  The proposal is provocative.  Yet, 
it suffers from a significant ambiguity and raises additional, practical 
difficulties that render the proposal undesirable.  Part IV of this 
Article will identify that ambiguity and outline those difficulties. 
I. RELATIVITY IN REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC THEORY OR 
TECHNIQUE ON WHICH THE PROPONENT’S EXPERT 
PROPOSES TO RELY—WHAT MUST BE VALIDATED 
In authentication law, to evaluate the sufficiency of a 
foundation, the judge must initially determine what the proponent’s 
witness claims the item of evidence to be.13  One foundation would 
suffice if the witness asserted that she had received a letter 
purportedly signed by Dale Nance, while an entirely different 
foundation would be necessary if the witness asserted that Dale Nance 
in fact signed the letter.  Likewise, in order to intelligently assess the 
adequacy of the proponent’s validation foundation for an expert 
opinion, the first question to be asked is what must be validated. 
In his recent article,14 Professor Risinger argued that it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the proponent to establish the global 
validity of the expert’s discipline.  The focus is narrower; it ought to 
be on the specific theory or technique on which the expert expects to 
rely.  Thus, suppose that the expert identifies himself or herself as a 
questioned document examiner.  Questioned document examination 
is a huge field, and its practitioners opine about a myriad of 
determinations such as the identification of paper and ink, the age of 
documents, the sequence of marks, and comparisons of handwriting 
style.15  Assume, though, that in a particular case the examiner 
proposes to testify that certain printing was forged.  To lay the 
foundation for that testimony, it would be neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the expert’s proponent to demonstrate the general 
validity of questioned document examination.  Rather, the 
proponent must establish that qualified questioned document 
examiners can reliably determine whether printing—as opposed to 
cursive writing—has been forged.16 
 
 12 Id. at 231. 
 13 FED. R. EVID. 901; 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL 
EVIDENCE § 311 (3d ed. 1998). 
 14 See Risinger, supra note 7. 
 15 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 21-1 to 
-8 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE]. 
 16 Risinger, supra note 7, at 798-800 (discussing United States v. Fujii, 152 F. 
Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Ill. 2000)). 
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It is true that at one point in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,17 
Justice Breyer utilized language suggesting that the proponent must 
demonstrate the global validity of the expert’s discipline.  In that 
passage, using the examples of astrology and necromancy, he asserted 
that sometimes “the discipline itself lacks reliability.”18  However, the 
trilogy of Daubert, General Electric Co. v. Joiner,19 and Kumho contains 
much more language pointing to the sensible conclusion that the 
expert’s precise theory or technique is what must be validated.  For 
example, as Professor Risinger has emphasized, in Daubert, the 
Supreme Court inquired whether the expert’s theory or technique is 
sufficiently reliable to perform “the task at hand.”20  The narrow focus 
is even more explicit in Kumho.  Justice Breyer noted that the 
question was not the general reliability of “a tire expert’s use of a 
visual and tactile inspection to determine whether overdeflection had 
caused [a] tire’s tread to separate from its steel-belted carcass.”21  The 
Justice stressed, rather, that the plaintiffs’ expert had invoked a more 
“particular” method, a theory that there are four characteristic signs 
of tire abuse and that the absence of at least two of the signs indicates 
that the accident was caused by a manufacturing defect in the tire.22  
In a separate passage, Justice Breyer pointed out that the expert 
“employed a more specific theory to establish the existence (or 
absence) of such abuse.”23 
In their article,24 Professors Gross and Mnookin propose a 
distinction between instruction and assessment.  They give an 
example drawn from the domain of psychological testimony.  In their 
terminology, it is an instruction for an expert psychologist to tell a 
jury that, as a general proposition, cross-racial identifications are less 
reliable than same-race identifications.  In contrast, the expert would 
be testifying to an assessment if she were to tell the jury that in her 
opinion, the cross-racial identification by the complainant in the 
instant case is likely to be unreliable.  Professors Gross and Mnookin 
suggest that a specific assessment requires a different, more extensive 
foundation than a general instruction.  That suggestion is sound, and 
 
 17 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 18 Id. at 151. 
 19 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 20 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. 
 21 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153-54. 
 22 Id. at 154. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Samuel R. Gross & Jennifer Mnookin, Expert Information and Expert Evidence: A 
Preliminary Taxonomy, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 141 (2003). 
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the courts have recognized this distinction.25  The distinction can be 
restated in terms of the specific theory the witness asserts.  For 
example, in instruction cases, the witness asserts the generalized 
proposition that cross-racial identifications are less trustworthy than 
same-race identifications.  In assessment cases, however, the expert 
makes a quite different assertion: that she knows of criteria or 
guidelines that enable her to determine whether a particular cross-
racial identification is likely to be untrustworthy.  Different expert 
assertions necessitate different reliability foundations. 
Simply stated, the only sensible approach is to focus on the 
expert’s specific assertion rather than the global validity of the 
expert’s discipline.  At any given time, the discourse in a field of 
expertise ordinarily includes a wide spectrum of propositions.26  Some 
propositions are speculations that will later be disproven.  Other 
propositions are conjectures that will subsequently be validated.  Still 
other propositions are assertions that have already been 
substantiated.  Given the state of knowledge in most expert fields, it 
would be silly to consider only the reliability of the broad field. 
There are, however, a few caveats.  At some point in the analysis, 
as Professor Allen observes in his contribution to this Symposium, a 
broader, more global focus is necessary.27  To assess the foundation 
for the specific theory or technique, the judge must inquire into the 
soundness of the methodology the expert used to validate the theory 
or technique.  The analysis of that methodology will require the 
judge to range beyond the precise theory or technique invoked in the 
instant case.  Furthermore, as Professor Nance warns, if Professor 
Risinger’s approach is “pressed to its logical conclusion, this would 
make determinations of reliability all but impossible, for the 
particular task at hand in a lawsuit is never replicated in research.”28 
Although I do not presume to speak for Professor Risinger, it 
would appear that his approach could be refined to meet these 
objections.  On the one hand, the validation foundation must target a 
proposition more general than the validity of the conclusion in the 
instant case.  In Daubert, Justice Blackmun stated that “[t]he focus . . . 
must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the 
conclusions that they generate.”29  That statement is true both in the 
 
 25 E.g., Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327 (Del. 2003). 
 26 JOHN ZIMAN, RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE GROUNDS FOR 
BELIEF IN SCIENCE 130-33 (1978); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (citing ZIMAN, supra). 
 27 Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Supreme Court: What Is the Problem?, 34 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1, 6 (2003). 
 28 Nance, supra note 1, at 210. 
 29 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
  
274 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:269 
sense that the novelty of the conclusion is no longer a bar to 
admissibility and in the sense that, in evaluating the foundation, the 
judge must consider the broader principles and methods employed 
to establish the conclusion. 
On the other hand, an adequate foundation will not target 
propositions broader than the theory or technique the expert invokes 
to justify the conclusion.  In Kumho, the expert was not content to 
premise his opinion on the general trustworthiness of visual and 
tactile inspection of the tire.  Instead, he attempted to make the 
opinion appear more authoritative and exacting by relying on a more 
specific theory.  The expert’s proponent, therefore, was obliged to lay 
a reliability foundation for that more specific theory.  That theory in 
effect served as the major premise for the expert’s reasoning 
process,30 and, consequently, that theory had to be shown to be 
reliable.  The reliability foundation must be judged relative to that 
particular theory. 
II. RELATIVITY IN REGARD TO THE USE TO WHICH THE 
PROPONENT INTENDS TO PUT THE EXPERT’S THEORY OR 
TECHNIQUE—WHY THE PROPONENT IS PROFFERING 
TESTIMONY ABOUT THE THEORY OR TECHNIQUE 
In character31 and hearsay32 doctrine, the proposed use of the 
testimony often determines the extent and type of foundation that 
the proponent must lay.  When the proffered evidence is logically 
relevant on a noncharacter33 or nonhearsay34 theory, the foundation 
will be much more minimal than if the proponent attempted to 
introduce the item for a substantive character or hearsay purpose.  
Analogously, in gauging the proponent’s foundation for an expert 
opinion, the judge must not only identify which theory or technique 
the expert is relying on; the judge must also force the proponent to 
specify why the proponent is offering the testimony about the theory 
or technique.  This may be what Professor Nance means when he 
writes that the degree of required reliability depends in part on the 
litigation context.35  To what use is the proponent putting the theory 
or technique? 
 
 30 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The “Bases” of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of 
Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1988); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Educational 
Significance of the Syllogistic Structure of Expert Testimony, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 1148 (1993). 
 31 FED. R. EVID. 404-05, 608. 
 32 Id. 801(c), 803-04, 807. 
 33 Id. 404(b). 
 34 Id. 801(c). 
 35 Nance, supra note 1, at 216-17. 
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There are numerous potential uses to which the proponent 
could put the testimony.  Two uses, however, are the most common.36  
The first is a descriptive37 or summarizational38 use.  Suppose, for 
instance, that the question is the meaning of the term “chicken” in a 
sales contract.39  The plaintiff calls an experienced member of the 
poultry industry to give expert testimony about the meaning of the 
term within the trade.  The only issue is the existence of the linguistic 
convention or usage.  If the witness testifies that she has been 
involved in a significant number of similar sales transactions involving 
the same term, that experience is an adequate foundation.  Or 
assume that in a criminal case, the prosecution calls an experienced 
undercover narcotics officer to give expert testimony that “lid” has a 
certain meaning in drug argot.40  The only issue is the existence of 
the convention within the illegal drug trade.  When the proponent’s 
limited purpose in introducing expert testimony is to establish the 
existence of a usage, convention, or practice, a showing that the 
witness has had a large number of similar experiences ought to 
suffice as an adequate foundation. 
The second type of use—inferential41 or translational42—is 
fundamentally different.  In this setting, the proponent wants to do 
more than prove the existence of the convention or practice.  The 
proponent is not merely trying to establish that theory or convention 
A exists; rather, the proponent wants the expert to employ theory A 
as a basis for drawing a further inference, B.  A foundation showing 
only the existence of theory A falls short of validating this proposed 
use of the expert testimony. 
 
 36 A third potential use is a normative usage.  A proponent might offer a 
bioethicist’s testimony for such a purpose.  See D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary 
Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, in DAVID L. 
FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND RESEARCH ISSUES § 2-
2.4 (2002) [hereinafter Functional Taxonomy]; Richard Delgado & Peter McAllen, The 
Moralist as Expert Witness, 62 B.U. L. REV. 869 (1982); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Expert 
Testimony by Ethicists: What Should Be the Norm?, 76 TEMPLE L. REV. 91 (2003); Bethany 
Spielman & George Agich, The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining 
Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043 (1999). 
 37 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of “Appropriate Validation” in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)—Interpreted in Light of the 
Broader Rationalist Tradition, Not the Narrow Scientific Tradition, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
735 (2003) [hereinafter Appropriate Validation]; Expert Witness: Beyond, supra note 8, at 
A18. 
 38 Functional Taxonomy, supra note 36, § 2-2.2.1. 
 39 Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
 40 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 41 Appropriate Validation, supra note 37, at 753. 
 42 Functional Taxonomy, supra note 36, § 2-2.3. 
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By way of example, suppose that the proponent wants an expert 
to testify about rape trauma syndrome to support an inference that a 
woman showing symptoms of the syndrome was indeed raped.  Here, 
the issue is not simply whether the theory of rape trauma syndrome is 
current in counseling circles.  The issue is whether the theory can be 
used as “a fact-finding tool.”43  Does the woman’s satisfaction of the 
profile support inference B, that she previously suffered a certain 
type of traumatic event, namely, a rape?  This contemplated use of 
the expert testimony necessitates a very different sort of reliability 
foundation. 
Given the contemplated use, the proponent should ordinarily be 
required to show the results of the use of the theory.44  Have there 
been attempts to employ the theory as a fact-finding tool?  If so, do 
the results of those attempts indicate that the theory enables the 
expert to accurately determine whether the alleged victim has indeed 
been raped?  For instance, was the profile derived from a database 
constructed by researchers who independently corroborated the rape 
allegations of the women who were included in the database?45  When 
the expertise in question is non-scientific in character, the expert may 
not be able to resort to the classic methodology of controlled 
experimentation and induction.46  Nevertheless, logic dictates that 
there be some showing that the use of the theory or technique 
enables the expert to accurately make the determination the 
proponent offers the opinion to establish.  The showing could be 
formal in character, including proficiency studies or prospective or 
retrospective research.  Or the showing could be informal.  Suppose 
that a dog handler claims that by observing his dog’s behavior, he can 
determine whether the dog is alerted to the presence of drugs or 
explosives.  At the very least, the judge should demand a showing of 
the track record of the dog working with the handler. 
The general necessity for a foundational showing of results to 
validate an inferential claim reflects the reasons why our society, 
including its legal system, relies so heavily on expert information.  It 
would be foolish to contend that we are so reliant on expert data 
because the average citizen has consciously adopted any particular 
 
 43 State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982). 
 44 Appropriate Validation, supra note 37, at 757. 
 45 Did the researchers contact: (1) emergency rooms to verify that the women 
displayed physical indicia of a violent sexual assault; (2) police departments to 
establish that the women’s complaints led to confessions by the alleged perpetrators; 
and (3) prosecutors to learn whether the women’s reports resulted in convictions? 
 46 MARTIN GOLDSTEIN & INGE F. GOLDSTEIN, HOW WE KNOW: AN EXPLORATION OF 
THE SCIENTIFIC PROCESS 3-11 (1978). 
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philosophy of science.  The average person has given little, if any, 
thought to that issue.  Rather, we place faith in science because there 
is an “immense body of results”47 proving “its worth in the realm of 
material technique.”48  Those concrete results—science’s many 
practical,49 successful applications50 and technological 
achievements51—are the pragmatic52 basis for the societal belief in the 
validity of systematic experimental testing and induction.  Just as 
those results are the primary explanation for our faith in general 
scientific methodology, a showing of results will usually be the key to 
validating specific inferential claims. 
III. RELIABILITY IN REGARD TO THE DEGREE OF CERTITUDE 
OF THE EXPERT’S ULTIMATE OPINION—HOW DEFINITELY 
DOES THE EXPERT PROPOSE TO PHRASE HIS OR HER 
ULTIMATE OPINION 
It is hornbook law, codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
that a lay witness must possess firsthand or personal knowledge to be 
qualified to testify about a fact or event.53  However, even when a lay 
witness has some personal knowledge, the permissible definiteness of 
his or her testimony depends on the extent of the foundation.  If a 
lay witness has a momentary, fleeting view of a person, the witness 
might be permitted to testify only that the person appeared to be a 
tall man.  But if the witness had a longer, better opportunity to 
observe the person, the witness may be allowed to go farther and 
testify that the person was the defendant.54 
There is a parallel in expert testimony law.  The degree of 
allowable definiteness of the expert’s final opinion should vary with 
the reliability foundation laid by the expert’s proponent.  Assume, for 
example, that an epidemiologist is prepared to testify only that a 
person’s exposure to a certain pesticide increases or enhances the 
person’s risk of contracting a particular illness.  Some courts would 
allow the epidemiologist to testify to that opinion so long as the 
supporting epidemiological study found a relative risk (“RR”) 
 
 47 ZIMAN, supra note 26, at 6-7. 
 48 Id. at 4. 
 49 Id. at 127. 
 50 Id. at 10. 
 51 Id. at 127. 
 52 Id. at 10. 
 53 FED. R. EVID. 602. 
 54 See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF 
SCIENCE AND STATUTES 192 (5th ed. 2002). 
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exceeding 1.0.55  Alternatively, suppose that the expert wanted to 
express the more definite opinion that it is probable that exposure to 
the pesticide can cause the illness.  In that event, many courts would 
rule the same foundation inadequate; they reason that only a study 
finding an RR greater than 2.0 justifies an opinion couched as a 
probability.56 
The Court’s analysis in Joiner is illustrative.  There, the plaintiffs’ 
experts opined that Joiner’s exposure to PCBs at work was “likely 
responsible for” his cancer.57  In the lead opinion, the Chief Justice 
carefully scrutinized the animal studies cited by the plaintiffs’ experts.  
He stressed that the case did not pose the broad, abstract question 
“‘whether animal studies can ever be a proper foundation for an 
expert’s opinion.’”58  Rather, the question presented was “whether 
these experts’ opinions were sufficiently supported by the animal 
studies on which they purported to rely.”59  The Chief Justice found 
so many dissimilarities60 between the facts of the Joiner case and the 
parameters in the studies that the trial judge had not abused his 
discretion in rejecting the opinion. 61  Hence, like the specific theory 
the expert invokes and the use to which the expert’s proponent wants 
to put the theory, the definiteness of the expert’s opinion helps 
determine the degree of reliability that the proponent must establish. 
IV. RELIABILITY IN REGARD TO THE OTHER EXPERT 
EVIDENCE REASONABLY AVAILABLE TO THE PROPONENT 
AND OPPONENT 
If Professor Nance had said only that the reliability concept is 
relative in the three regards discussed above, I would be in complete 
agreement with him.  He identifies a fourth respect, however, in 
which he contends the courts should treat reliability as a gradational 
or relative concept.  He argues that the judge ought to evaluate the 
reliability of the proffered expert evidence in relation and 
comparison to alternative, available expert testimony.62  According to 
 
 55 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 15-5(D). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 140. 
 58 Id. at 144 (citation omitted). 
 59 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 60 Id.  Although Joiner was an adult, the studies involved infant mice.  Relative to 
size, Joiner’s exposure was much less than that in the studies.  In the studies, PCB’s 
were injected directly, while Joiner’s exposure was dermal.  Finally, Joiner developed 
small-cell carcinomas, while the mice developed alveologenic adenomas. 
 61 Id. at 146-47. 
 62 Nance, supra note 1, at Part II. 
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Professor Nance, “exclusion is appropriate on this theory only when 
more reliable expertise is (a) reasonably available to the proponent, 
and (b) not reasonably available to the opponent.”63  “[W]hen . . . 
more reliable expertise is reasonably available to the opponent to 
present . . ., then no exclusion of evidence is warranted . . . .”64  In 
Professor Nance’s view, his proposed approach “will place greater 
demands on powerful civil defendants than on impecunious civil 
plaintiffs.”65  Professor Nance then expands on his definition of 
reasonable availability.  He states that 
greater reliability might be unavailable to a party within the 
context of a particular case . . ., yet reasonably available to that 
party within the context of repeated litigation of the same or 
similar issue.  At the outer reaches of the better evidence idea, 
repeat players, such as the state in regard to forensic science 
techniques, may plausibly be considered in regard to the long run 
of cases, rather than based on what is reasonably available in the 
short enough run to address a particular case.66 
As Parts I through III explain, I agree with Professor Nance that 
the concept of reliability under Federal Rule 702 should be treated as 
relative in several respects.  In this fourth respect, however, I part 
company with Professor Nance.  Although a best evidence rule or 
principle can operate legitimately at trial in several respects, it should 
not be incorporated into the judge’s evaluation of a reliability 
foundation under Rule 702.  Subpart 1 discusses the legitimate scope 
of the operation of a best evidence principle at trial while Subpart 2 
critiques Professor Nance’s proposal. 
A. The Legitimate Operation of a Best Evidence Rule or Principle at 
Trial. 
A true best evidence rule, of course, operates under Article X of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.67  In several respects, the drafters 
relaxed the common-law best evidence rule.  For example, they 
broadened the definition of “duplicate”68 and made duplicates 
presumptively as admissible as originals.69  The drafters, however, 
decided to retain a liberalized version of the rule rather than 
altogether abolishing the rule. 
 
 63 Id. at 237. 
 64 Id. at 231 (emphasis omitted). 
 65 Id. at 237. 
 66 Id. 
 67 FED. R. EVID. Art. X. 
 68 Id. 1001(4). 
 69 Id. 1003. 
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There are other ways a best evidence principle may legitimately 
come into play during trial.  It is certainly permissible for an 
opponent to attack the weight of the proponent’s expert testimony by 
pointing out that the expert neglected to use a superior analytic 
technique.70  Suppose, for instance, that a prosecution trace evidence 
expert utilized a conventional optical microscope to analyze 
associative physical evidence.  The usual working magnification of an 
optical microscope is 1,000 times.  To attack the weight of the 
expert’s testimony, the defense counsel could force the expert to 
concede that she did not use a scanning electron microscope 
(“SEM”) to visualize the evidence.  An SEM can produce 
magnifications exceeding 200,000 times. 
Similarly, in a drug case defended by Mr. Shellow, if the 
prosecution were foolish enough to be content to rely on an addict’s 
visual identification of the alleged drug,  Mr. Shellow would be 
certain to make the prosecution pay for that foolishness.  There are, 
to be sure, limits to the efficacy of cross-examination.  A skillful 
opponent, however, can nonetheless mount an effective weight attack 
by underscoring that the proponent’s expert employed an inferior 
analytic technique.71  The prospect of such an attack gives the 
proponent a natural incentive to proffer the best evidence available.  
That potentially potent incentive is already built into the adversary 
system. 
Just as an expert’s failure to use a superior technique can be the 
basis for an attack on the weight of the expert’s testimony, the failure 
occasionally can render the case of the expert’s proponent 
vulnerable to a legal sufficiency attack.  The case law on the 
identification of contraband drugs furnishes an example.  By the 
majority view, a visual identification by an experienced drug user or 
narcotics officer constitutes admissible non-scientific, expert 
testimony.72  Some of the same courts admitting such testimony, 
however, caution that “[w]e suspect that it would be a rare case in 
which a witness’s statement that a particular substance looked like a 
controlled substance would alone be sufficient to support a 
conviction.”73  In a number of additional cases, courts have held that 
 
 70 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 
10-8 (3d ed. 1997). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Michael D. Blanchard & Gabriel J. Chin, Identifying the Enemy in the War on 
Drugs: A Critique of the Developing Rule Permitting Visual Identification of Indescript White 
Powder in Narcotics Prosecutions, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 562-65 (1998). 
 73 Id. at 562 (citing Commonwealth v. Dawson, 504 N.E.2d 1056, 1057-58 (Mass. 
1987)). 
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although admissible, testimony about non-specific drug identification 
tests, such as field color change tests, is legally insufficient to establish 
the identity of a substance.74  These courts insist on confirmation of 
the substance’s identity by a superior, more specific analytic 
methodology such as gas chromatography/mass spectrometry 
(“GC/MS”). 
Finally, a best evidence principle may operate under the aegis of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.  Rule 403 authorizes the judge to 
exclude relevant evidence in her discretion when the probative value 
of the evidence “is substantially outweighed by” countervailing 
probative dangers such as “needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence” and “unfair prejudice.”75  The accompanying Advisory 
Committee Note states that “[t]he availability of other means of proof 
may . . . be an appropriate factor” for the judge to consider.76  For 
example, assume that in a drug prosecution, the government has two 
available laboratory analysts who have confirmed the substance’s 
identity as cocaine by gas chromatography (“GC”) as well as GC/MS.  
In order to “overkill,” the government also plans to call the 
defendant’s parole officer, a former narcotics officer.  The officer is 
prepared to testify that he saw the substance in the defendant’s 
possession at the time of arrest and that, in his opinion, the substance 
was cocaine.  Calling the parole officer as a witness creates the risk of 
prejudice to the defendant, since it may “slip out” that the witness is 
the defendant’s parole officer, implying that the defendant has a 
prior criminal record.77  Further, the presentation of the officer’s 
testimony would arguably amount to the “needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence,” because common sense suggests that the jury 
would attach much more weight to the scientific analyses.  The 
combination of probative dangers would certainly warrant the judge’s 
exclusion of the officer’s testimony.  For that matter, the obviously 
cumulative character of the evidence might in itself prompt the judge 
to exclude it.  The introduction of the officer’s testimony is likely to 
have little or no effect on the jury’s decision as to whether there is 
adequate evidence that the drug found in the defendant’s possession 
 
 74 People v. Hagberg, 703 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), appeal granted, 712 
N.E.2d 820 (Ill. 1999); 2 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 23-5 (collecting cases). 
 75 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 76 See id. 403 advisory committee’s note; see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 
U.S. 172 (1997). 
 77 FED. R. EVID. 404-05, 609.  If the defendant elected not to testify, the 
prosecution could not introduce testimony about the defendant’s record under Rule 
609.  Further, the defendant’s prior criminal acts might not be logically relevant on 
any noncharacter theory of admissibility. 
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is cocaine. 
B. The Problematic Nature of the Proposed Best Evidence Principle 
Operating as a Component of the Reliability Analysis Under Rule 
702. 
Professor Nance acknowledges that best evidence reasoning can 
come into play under Rule 403.78  However, he favors giving the best 
evidence principle wider play.  He argues that the judicial system 
should “want a . . . set of standards” under Rule 702 that is “not 
simply redundant of Rule 403.”79  Professor Nance expressly states 
that Rule 702 should be construed as incorporating a best evidence 
principle imposing “stricter demands” than Rule 403.80 
As previously stated, in an earlier exchange with Professor 
Faigman and his coauthors, I expressed my opposition to the 
formulation of a best evidence principle in Rule 702 analysis.81  My 
opposition rests on both statutory construction and policy reasons.  
The drafters evidently did not contemplate any best evidence 
principle under Article VII.  Having relaxed the best evidence rule 
proper under Article X, it would have been at least anomalous for 
them to have decided to extend the reach of the common-law 
principle to a new area, namely, expert testimony law.  Any such 
extension would be at odds with the Advisory Committee Note to 
Rule 702.  That note not only indicates that a witness need not be a 
specialist to qualify as an expert; the note also sanctions the 
admission of a landowner’s opinion of the value of his or her 
property, a markedly inferior type of opinion testimony.82 
Quite apart from the interpretive difficulty of justifying reading a 
best evidence principle into Rule 702, Professor Nance’s proposal for 
the creation of such a principle under Rule 702 is problematic.  The 
initial problem is that Professor Nance never provides a substantive 
definition of “reliability.”  He negatively rejects several alternative 
“blind alleys,”83 but he does not venture affirmative guidance for 
defining the term.  At one point, he states that the judge should 
“plac[e] herself in the position of the jury” and ask “whether the 
challenged expertise is so unreliable, in comparison to other 
 
 78 Nance, supra note 1, at 202. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 228. 
 81 A Final Comment, supra note 10, at 669.  See generally Enough is Enough, supra note 
10. 
 82 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 83 Nance, supra note 1, at 216-22. 
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expertise offered by the same party, that the judge would ignore the 
challenged proffer if she were the trier of fact.”84  That statement 
hardly functions as a working definition of “reliability.”  Rather than 
telling the judge what algorithm to use or which factors to consider, 
this proposal seemingly requires the judge to intuit or speculate as to 
the reliability standards the jurors would employ.  The proposal gives 
the judge detailed directions as to how to rule once the judge decides 
whether more “reliable” evidence is reasonably available.  But those 
directions are of little help to the judge without a substantive 
definition of reliability.  That definition has to be one of the starting 
points of the judge’s analysis, and the proposal is conspicuously 
lacking a definition. 
The lack of a definition of reliability is a major flaw in the 
proposal.  A wide variety of expert techniques could address the issue 
to which the proffered evidence relates.  As Professor Nance notes, 
“When a matter is thought by counsel to be amenable to expert 
assistance, there are often numerous specializations and hundreds or 
thousands of practitioners thereof who might be called to testify.”85  
Suppose, for example, that one available technique has been 
subjected to more rigorous peer review,86 but another has a smaller 
rate of error,87 and still a third enjoys more widespread support in the 
specialty community.88  Under the proposal, how does the judge 
decide which technique is the better or best one?  Professor Nance’s 
proposal requires the judge to make that decision, but the proposal 
does not furnish the judge with guidance as to how to make the 
decision. 
Moreover, the adoption of the proposal will have untoward 
policy consequences.  The most immediate consequence would be to 
render Rule 702 unworkable as a rule of trial evidence for jury trials.  
The proposal multiplies the number of foundational issues that the 
judge must resolve before making a final ruling on the objection to 
the proponent’s evidence.  The judge must decide: (1) whether the 
proponent’s evidence is “reliable”; (2) whether other expert 
techniques address the same question; (3) whether those techniques 
are better than the technique utilized by the proponent’s expert; (4) 
whether a better technique is reasonably available to the proponent; 
(5) whether the better technique is reasonably available to the 
 
 84 Id. at 227-28. 
 85 Id. at 227. 
 86 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
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opponent; and (6) whether the proponent is a repeat player.89  The 
administration of this rule during a jury trial will necessitate either 
horrendously long sidebar conferences or prolonged recesses. 
It is not just that the proposal will lengthen the amount of time 
devoted to the litigation of Rule 702 objections.  In addition, the 
proposal will permit, and in some cases require, the judge to consider 
information to which the jury should not be exposed.  All of these 
preliminary questions will fall under Rule 104(a) rather than Rule 
104(b).90  The final sentence of Rule 104(a) reads, “In making its 
determination [under Rule 104(a), the judge] is not bound by the 
rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.”91 
Suppose, for example, that the defense contends that the 
plaintiff is a repeat player.  In support of that contention, the defense 
might proffer foundational testimony about the plaintiff’s frequent 
involvement in prior, similar suits.  In effect, that testimony would be 
evidence of the plaintiff’s litigiousness—a type of evidence that the 
jury is ordinarily precluded from hearing.92  Assume alternatively that 
the plaintiff contends that although a better type of expertise exists, it 
is reasonably available to the defendant because only the defendant 
can afford that type of expert.  By distinguishing between 
“impecunious civil plaintiffs” and “powerful civil defendants,” 
Professor Nance strongly implies that the litigant’s financial ability is 
a relevant, if not dispositive, consideration on the question of 
reasonable availability.93  The jury, however, is usually shielded from 
evidence of a defendant’s wealth unless punitive damages are at 
issue.94  Given the volume and type of information relevant to the 
preliminary facts implicated by Professor Nance’s proposal, in many 
cases the issues would have to be aired at a pretrial hearing rather 
than at trial.  Daubert and its progeny have already triggered a trend 
toward pretrial resolution of the admissibility of expert testimony.95  
The adoption of Professor Nance’s proposal would accelerate that 
trend.  The net result of the adoption of the proposal would be more 
and longer pretrial hearings challenging the admissibility of expert 
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testimony. 
The acceleration of that trend might disadvantage the very 
classes of litigants whom Professor Nance hopes to benefit.  Again, he 
argues that his proposal would not only benefit the judicial system 
but also “impecunious civil plaintiffs.”96  Quite the opposite could 
come to pass.  No matter how the burden of persuasion is allocated 
on these new preliminary facts,97 the proposal allows wealthy 
corporations to litigate additional issues before trial as a condition to 
the plaintiff’s right to introduce expert testimony.  By doing so, the 
proposal will enhance the defense’s ability to raise the cost of pretrial 
proceedings to such dizzying heights98 that even a plaintiff with a 
meritorious claim will be bludgeoned into an unfavorable 
settlement.99  In the aftermath of Daubert, civil defendants appear to 
be gaining pretrial summary judgment in a higher percentage of 
cases.100  The adoption of Professor Nance’s proposal might intensify 
that trend.  Thus, to use Professor Sanders’s expression,101 the 
proposal raises profound procedural justice concerns. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While in the final analysis Professor Nance’s best evidence 
proposal is flawed, he has performed an important service by 
focusing attention on the respects in which the reliability standard 
under Rule 702 should be considered relative.  Indeed, a synthesis of 
those respects has the promise to furnish a working approach to the 
problem of deciding whether a proponent’s reliability foundation 
suffices under Rule 702.  It is submitted that the judge should initiate 
his or her analysis by identifying the precise theory or technique on 
which the expert contemplates relying.  If the expert refuses to 
articulate a general theory or technique, the expert gives the judge 
no choice; the judge must conclude that the expert’s opinion rests 
only on ipse dixit.  The Supreme Court has twice made it quite clear 
that, as a matter of law, this is an inadequate basis for an expert 
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opinion.102  Once the expert identifies his or her major premise, the 
judge will know what must be validated. 
At the next step, the judge should press the expert’s proponent 
to specify why the proponent wants to introduce the testimony about 
the theory or technique.  Is the proponent introducing the testimony 
for purely descriptive or summarizational purposes?  If so, the 
proponent’s reliability foundation must demonstrate that the expert 
has had a large number of similar experiences.  In contrast, if the 
proponent wants to proffer the testimony for inferential or 
translational purposes, the reliability foundation must be more 
extensive.  Ideally, the proponent can marshal testimony about 
controlled experimentation and induction validating the inference.  
Even in the case of non-scientific expertise, however, the proponent 
should usually be obliged to lay a foundation establishing the results 
of the use of the theory or technique and demonstrating that those 
results show that the theory or technique enables the expert to 
accurately draw the inference in question. 
Finally, particularly in the case of inferential or translational 
claims, the judge ought to insist that the expert specify the degree of 
certitude of his or her final opinion.  The degree of allowable 
certitude depends in large part on the state of the research data cited 
as validation for the theory or technique.  In some cases, the state of 
those data will not support anything beyond a conclusion that there is 
a possible nexus between A and B. 
The answers to these three questions specify the proponent’s 
“claim” about the proffered expert evidence.  For example, after 
analyzing the questions, the judge might conclude that the 
proponent is essentially claiming that by invoking the rape trauma 
syndrome theory (step #1), the proponent’s expert can accurately 
determine whether there is a probability (step #3) that the 
complainant was in fact (step #2) raped.  To make the required 
“reliability” determination, the judge would inquire whether, as a 
matter of logic, the proponent’s foundation is adequate to support 
that precise claim.  At each step in the analysis, the judge would be 
making a familiar inquiry.  The first step is similar to the starting 
point in authentication analysis, the next step is analogous to a 
common stage in character and hearsay analysis, and the final step is 
parallel to a frequent inquiry in applying the personal knowledge 
doctrine. 
Admittedly, this approach does not constitute a mathematical 
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algorithm, and it will not mechanically yield judicial rulings.  To an 
important degree, this approach requires the trial judge to exercise 
prudential judgment in making such determinations as whether 
there are enough prior experiences and whether they are similar 
enough to the facts in the instant litigation.  Ultimately, no matter 
what verbal formula we add as gloss to Rule 702, there may be no 
escape from reliance on the trial judiciary’s judgment and common 
sense.  In the final analysis, however, that conclusion should come as 
no surprise.  As the late Karl Popper once remarked, science itself is 
only “common-sense knowledge writ large.”103 
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